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Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council
Sixty-eighth year**

**Letter dated 1 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of
Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith, in two separate annexes, both the recorded infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of May 2013 (see annex II). I have the honour to draw your attention to the systematic abuses by Turkey of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus by blatantly violating international law in a way that seriously jeopardizes safety and security in the greater region.

I would be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and the Security Council.

(Signed) Nicholas Emiliou

13-38321 (E) 120713



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Annex I to the letter dated 1 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
2 May 2013	1659-1744	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia air control centre (ACC).
	1957-2130	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 May 2013	1100-1120	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1313-1431	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1440-1459	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 May 2013	0751-0832	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1154-1238	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
8 May 2013	1040-1055	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1347-1458	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1748-1833	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1816-1858	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 May 2013	1229-1313	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
13 May 2013	1137-1200	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1340-1440	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1436-1500	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
14 May 2013	0908-1117	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0935-0955	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0942-1030	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
15 May 2013	1130-1139	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1230-1458	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1252-1308	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1355-1415	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.
16 May 2013	1430-1619	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0835-0841	One C-650 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	0855-0940	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1103-1113	One C-650 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1125-1142	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1407-1458	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1408-1455	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1702-1718	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.
17 May 2013	0919-1010	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1210-1305	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1226-1300	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
20 May 2013	1420-1520	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1845-1907	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
21 May 2013	0823-0855	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1103-1146	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1104-1125	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1420-1446	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
22 May 2013	1010-1109	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1156-1355	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1510-1548	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
23 May 2013	1122-1228	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1713-1753	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
24 May 2013	1001-1133	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1339-1358	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1915-1935	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.
25 May 2013	1128-1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1754-1817	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
27 May 2013	0935-1020	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1053-1113	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	1202-1217	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
28 May 2013	1403-1533	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1057-1119	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1335-1700	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1415-1448	One C-160 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2011-2033	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
29 May 2013	2048-2108	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.
	0824-0843	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, while landing at the illegal airport of Tympou.
	0943-1001	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC, having taken off from the illegal airport of Tympou.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
	1053-1155	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1440-1638	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 May 2013	0826-0901	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0826-1051	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
31 May 2013	1024-1107	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1115-1140	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1157-1410	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit or contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 1 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
23 April-1 May 2013	One A-576 Turkish tug boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
23 April-6 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
25 April-13 May 2013	One P-338 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
27 April-2 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
1-10 May 2013	One F-491 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
4-8 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
7-13 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
10-21 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
10-22 May 2013	One A-576 Turkish tug boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
13-17 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
13-19 May 2013	One P-338 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
18-19 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
20-26 May 2013	One F-493 Turkish frigate violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
21 May 2013	One NL-125 Turkish landing ship violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
21-23 May 2013	One C-152 Turkish landing craft tank violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
22-24 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
22-25 May 2013	One P-338 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
23 May 2013	One NL-125 Turkish landing ship violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
23-26 May 2013	One C-152 Turkish landing craft tank violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Kyrenia.
24-28 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
25-26 May 2013	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.

<i>Dates</i>	<i>Nature of violation</i>
25-26 May 2013	One P-338 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
25 May-June 2013	One A-576 Turkish tug boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos.
30 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.
31 May 2013	One F-501 Turkish corvette violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Ammochostos, while participating in naval exercises of the occupation forces.



Security Council

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Letter dated 2 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you, and through you to the members of the Security Council, the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit to Khartoum of Riek Machar Teny, Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan, from 30 June to 2 July 2013.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Idris Ismail Faragalla **Hassan**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.



Annex to the letter dated 2 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint statement

Riek Machar Teny, Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan, paid an official visit to Khartoum from 30 June to 2 July 2013, accompanied by a delegation comprising a number of Ministers and senior officials in the Government of South Sudan, to discuss with the Government of the Sudan the recent crisis in the relations between the two countries.

During the visit, the two sides discussed the issue of implementation of the cooperation agreements, in particular, the security issue: the Sudan had accused South Sudan of supporting its rebels, which had led to the decision of the Sudan to suspend the agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on oil and economic matters as of 9 June 2013, and to the shut-down by the Ministry of Petroleum of the Sudan of the processing and transportation facilities in the Sudan for oil received from South Sudan during a period of 60 days as of 9 June 2013. The parties also discussed other claims and counterclaims.

After exhaustive deliberations on the items referred to above, the parties agreed on the following:

1. To refer the complaints to the agreed relevant bilateral mechanisms.
2. To reiterate their acceptance of the proposals of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on the current stalemate, and call on the African Union and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), to expedite the immediate implementation of the AUHIP proposal.
3. To commit themselves to bilateral dialogue and discussions without prejudice to the ongoing facilitation of AUHIP.
4. To respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State.
5. To refrain completely from supporting and harbouring one another's dissidents, in accordance with the agreements on security arrangements.
6. To normalize and promote the bilateral relations between the two States.
7. To operationalize the mechanism for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and dispute resolution relating to the cooperation agreements signed in Addis Ababa on 23 April 2013.
8. To support any peace initiatives that will bring about peace and stability in the two States.
9. To finalize the outstanding comprehensive peace agreement issues: namely, the borders and the final status of Abyei.

The discussions were conducted between the parties in an atmosphere of transparency and mutual frankness. The two sides expressed their strong resolve for the resolution of the current crisis between the two countries, in accordance with the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty, non-interference in each other's

internal affairs, non-harbouring or provision of support to elements hostile to each other, and continuation of cooperation at the bilateral level, within the joint African mechanisms agreed upon by the parties.

President Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-bashir received the Vice-President of the Republic of South Sudan, who briefed the President on the discussions with the first Vice-President of the Republic of the Sudan and the anticipated outcome.

Khartoum, 1 July 2013

**Security Council**

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**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
operation in Cyprus****I. Introduction**

1. The present report on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) covers developments from 16 December 2012 to 20 June 2013 and brings up to date, since the issuance of my report (S/2013/7) dated 7 January 2013, the record of activities carried out by UNFICYP pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2089 (2013).
2. As at 20 June 2013, the strength of the military component stood at 859 for all ranks and the strength of the police component stood at 68 (see annex).

II. Mission of good offices

3. There have been no negotiations between the two leaders since March 2012. From April 2012 all through the period leading to the presidential elections held in the Republic of Cyprus in February 2013, the sides met instead at the level of the representatives in a process intended to reinvigorate the technical committees that had been established in 2008 to improve the daily lives of Cypriots through confidence-building measures. The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage made important progress in the implementation of emergency measures for the protection of cultural heritage sites on both sides of the island. This included the establishment, in February, of a multi-donor partnership for the restoration of the Apostolos Andreas monastery under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). On behalf of the two communities, two protocols were signed with the Church of Cyprus and the Evkaf Administration, marking an important milestone in the collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the preservation of their common cultural heritage.
4. Other positive steps included the implementation of a fire prevention campaign by the Technical Committee on the Environment and the activation of a communications mechanism in the event of an outbreak of a communicable disease by the Technical Committee on Health Matters. During the same period, the Crisis Management Committee undertook a joint firefighting exercise within the United Nations protected area. While the reinvigoration of the technical committees in the



latter half of 2012 was a welcome development, their work does not constitute a substitute for substantive negotiations.

5. The election of Nicos Anastasiades in the Republic of Cyprus on 24 February 2013 brought new hope and cautious optimism for constructive talks between the two communities. Mr. Anastasiades, as the new Greek Cypriot leader, has reiterated his commitment to solving the Cyprus problem and has indicated that he will dedicate time and effort to preparing fully for the resumption of the negotiation process. Following the February 2013 elections, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Derviş Eroğlu, also reiterated his readiness to resume the negotiations as soon as possible and has indicated that his team has begun detailed preparations to engage with its Greek Cypriot counterparts. On 30 May 2013, Mr. Anastasiades and Mr. Eroğlu met for the first time as leaders of their respective communities in a convivial atmosphere at a dinner hosted by my Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, and my Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Lisa M. Buttenheim.

III. Activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

6. UNFICYP aims first and foremost to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. Its mandate requires reconciling, as far as possible, security considerations and the maintenance of the military status quo while allowing Cypriots who live and work in the buffer zone to pursue civilian activities and enjoy full and productive lives. Such an approach, when successful, builds confidence between the communities and contributes to the overall United Nations effort in support of the peace process.

A. Prevention of a recurrence of fighting and the maintenance of the military status quo

7. During the reporting period, UNFICYP continued to maintain the integrity and stability of the buffer zone. Despite the ongoing low level of military violations committed by the opposing forces, which resulted in occasional altercations with UNFICYP, cooperation between UNFICYP and the opposing forces continued to be generally positive. The mission continued to maintain working relations with the Turkish forces, Turkish Cypriot security forces and the National Guard, at all levels of command. However, the non-recognition by the opposing forces of the aide-memoire of 1989 and incidents that challenge UNFICYP authority in the buffer zone continue to be problematic.

8. On a number of occasions over the reporting period, the opposing forces, in particular the Turkish forces, have questioned the United Nations delineation of the ceasefire lines and, consequently, the extent of the buffer zone in certain areas. This has led to unauthorized construction of roads and infrastructure works, such as those undertaken recently by the Turkish Cypriot side at Avlona and on the Pyla plateau, all inside the buffer zone. While such actions are civilian-led, they received the support of the Turkish forces.

9. Following the move forward by the Turkish forces in the buffer zone near the village of Avlona last November, which was aimed at preventing unauthorized

civilian activity close to their ceasefire line (see S/2013/7, para. 7), the area remained generally stable. Regular UNFICYP patrolling and observation in the area, together with the re-establishment of an UNFICYP standing presence and constant liaison with the Turkish forces, had seemed to allay concerns, to the extent that in mid-June UNFICYP restored the status quo ante by removing a line of barrels it had placed there in November 2012. Disappointingly, despite the provision by UNFICYP of improved security in the area, Turkish forces immediately moved forward into the buffer zone and reinstalled a fence in the area. The UNFICYP Force Commander met with his counterpart in an attempt to return the area to the status quo ante, and these efforts continue.

10. In addition to these specific challenges, the opposing forces maintained attempts to effect low-level changes to the military status quo across the buffer zone. Through its liaison role, UNFICYP resisted such attempts to the extent possible and, in reaffirming its authority, continued to play a critical part in building confidence between the opposing forces. The mission's observation, reporting and liaison infrastructure, underpinned by regular patrolling, has enabled issues to be resolved at the lowest appropriate level and remains an important element in maintaining confidence and stability.

11. Previously reported military positions established by both opposing forces inside the buffer zone that violate the status quo remain in place. The Turkish forces frequently overmanned the liaison post at Strovilia in violation of the military status quo. The United Nations continues to hold the Government of Turkey responsible for the status quo in Varosha.

12. During the reporting period, patrolling by UNFICYP military forces along the Green Line in the sensitive Nicosia old town was somewhat restricted for safety reasons. Neglect and adverse weather conditions over many years have rendered a number of buildings in that area unsafe. A joint approach by the mission's military and civil affairs components, together with the Nicosia master plan — a bicommunal mechanism established in 1979 to address urban issues in old town Nicosia — is aiming at developing the most effective means of mitigating this danger.

13. Tensions related to exploration for natural resources within the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus continued during the reporting period. Drilling activities continued in order to verify the presence and extent of hydrocarbon resources within designated blocks to the south and south-east of the island. Turkey continued to protest the development. Following the start of a second phase of drilling activities, on 14 June, Turkey issued a statement confirming its position in support of Turkish Cypriot objections that such actions prejudice the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. The statement indicated Turkey's intention to provide assistance for the exploration for natural resources by the Turkish Cypriots to the south of the island. In response, on 17 June, Cyprus issued a statement in defence of its sovereign right to explore and exploit natural resources in its exclusive economic zone. The statement condemned Turkey's intention to provide support for exploration for natural resources by the Turkish Cypriots, noting that such a development would increase tension in the area.

B. Demining

14. The two sides continue to withhold access for demining to the four remaining mined areas in the buffer zone. One area is located south of Varosha and is under the control of the Turkish Forces; three areas are in the Louroujina pocket and are under the control of the National Guard.

15. There has been no progress in terms of fulfilling the Security Council's call upon the parties to extend demining operations outside the buffer zone. Concerns persist, in particular with regard to mined areas adjacent to the buffer zone, where severe wet weather may have displaced mines into the buffer zone. In conjunction with the United Nations Mine Action Service, UNFICYP is seeking to address this hazard as soon as possible. I strongly recommend that minefields adjacent to the buffer zone be removed, as both a safety and confidence-building measure.

C. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

16. UNFICYP approved all 17 civilian project proposals received during the reporting period, which were half the usual number and included very few proposals for new construction projects. As part of its ongoing support for such activities, UNFICYP continued to monitor the provision of basic services to both communities and to facilitate the maintenance of essential infrastructure for public utilities and services in the buffer zone. There were no instances of joint cooperation between the two sides on such technical work during the reporting period.

17. In line with its mandate to contribute to a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP continued to encourage authorities, local community leaders and civilians to cooperate with the mission by providing relevant information on civilian projects in the buffer zone, in compliance with the UNFICYP permit system. In this regard and in order to promote cooperation with the mission, as well as intercommunal dialogue among community leaders in the buffer zone, UNFICYP hosted a meeting in March of mayors and *muchtars* from both communities. Despite these efforts, UNFICYP continued to face challenges to its authority by contractors and individuals carrying out unauthorized activities, on occasion in a manner that increased tensions in the buffer zone, which adversely affected the military status quo and required intensive liaison to resolve. The recent unauthorized laying of pipes by the Turkish Cypriot side on the Pyla plateau in the buffer zone is a case in point.

18. During the reporting period, the university which opened in Pyla — the only mixed village in the buffer zone — in October 2012 (see S/2013/7, para. 15) continued to operate without UNFICYP authorization. UNFICYP remains concerned about the potential impact that any influx of students may have on the delicate demographic balance in the village. So far, the student body, the vast majority of which is Greek Cypriot, has remained low at about 145 students. Without agreement between UNFICYP and all parties concerned regarding security, policing and other arrangements, further expansion may have a destabilizing effect on law and order in the area.

19. Regarding outstanding cases of assault in the buffer zone by Greek Cypriots on UNFICYP personnel and damage to United Nations property, the mission urged the relevant authorities to take prompt action. Occasional restrictions on United Nations

staff members of Greek Cypriot origin seeking to undertake their duties in the north also remained in place.

20. Beyond the buffer zone, UNFICYP continued to address day-to-day humanitarian and welfare issues faced by Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the north and by Turkish Cypriots residing in the south. Twenty home visits were conducted during the reporting period. Despite continued voicing of concerns over the deteriorating health of elderly Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, requests for Greek-speaking doctors to treat these patients continued to be denied. The transfer of a defibrillator to assist one of the patients was also denied. As to the Turkish Cypriots in the south, UNFICYP continued to monitor their access to health and welfare support.

21. UNFICYP welcomed the decision by the Greek Cypriot side in April to allow the transfer of new carpets from the north to the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque in Larnaca, although some restrictions to religious worship in the mosque remained in place. There were no new developments regarding the establishment of a Turkish language school in Limassol. UNFICYP also facilitated 11 religious and commemorative events, involving more than 1,100 individuals, which were held in the buffer zone or required crossings to either side. The Greek Cypriot, Maronite and Armenian communities continued to conduct religious services in the north according to the practice of previous years, but no new sites were opened for worship.

22. UNFICYP continued its weekly delivery of humanitarian assistance to 347 Greek Cypriots and 124 Maronites in the north. It also continued to observe the functioning of the Greek Cypriot schools in the Karpas peninsula. Two requests by a Greek Cypriot family and a Greek Cypriot woman to return to the Karpas region are pending. UNFICYP assisted in addressing the legal and humanitarian issues surrounding the imprisonment and temporary detention of four Turkish Cypriots in the south and five Maronite and Greek Cypriots in the north. It conducted regular visits and facilitated family visits to inmates at detention facilities in the other community to ascertain the conditions and welfare of those serving sentences. The mission attended 14 court hearings to enhance confidence in the judicial proceedings.

23. UNFICYP continued to support civil society initiatives that foster bicomunal cooperation and reconciliation. It facilitated 86 bicomunal events, in which almost 3,000 individuals participated, in cooperation with international and local partners. The events included regular meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political party leaders and representatives under the auspices of the Embassy of Slovakia, as well as sporting, cultural and educational events.

24. UNFICYP lent support to a variety of bicomunal projects in the buffer zone implemented by UNDP and its local partners. In May the Cyprus Community Media Centre, whose premises are in the buffer zone next to the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia, launched the island's first bicomunal Internet broadcasting facility. The multimedia studio aims at providing Cypriots with a neutral source of news and information on issues concerning peace and reconciliation, and developments in the two communities.

25. UNFICYP police continued to assist and facilitate a number of investigations conducted by the respective police services into criminal matters that had occurred

within the buffer zone. It did so through joint patrols to intercept poachers and smugglers, and to address increased incidents of theft and environmental cases of illegal tree felling, pollution and dumping. Of particular significance was its intervention, together with local environmental officers, at a pig farm where unregulated discharge of effluent risked polluting water sources through the buffer zone to the north, aggravating intercommunal relations and, potentially, the security situation.

26. The Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters, facilitated by UNFICYP police, met four times during the reporting period. Discussions included plans for a bicommunal seminar on domestic crime issues, to be held on the island in 2013, joint attendance at a workshop held at a university in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and ways in which to improve respective investigations through the possible exchange of evidence and wanted persons. The Joint Communications Room continued to provide a forum for enhanced cooperation between the two sides through the exchange of information on criminal matters. During the reporting period, 19 new information requests were received and 49 further exchanges were recorded, in equal measure from each side, either in response to requests or offering unsolicited information. As a result of this cooperation and goodwill, including shortened response times, eight criminal cases have been opened, four of which are currently in court, including instances of organized crime throughout the buffer zone. In January the Joint Communications Room also helped to defuse tension following the vandalism of a mosque in Dhenia, which was in the very early stages of restoration by UNDP.

27. UNFICYP police continued to provide escorts for convoys with Turkish Cypriot civilians and humanitarian supplies in accordance with the leaders' agreement of October 2010 that was reached upon the opening of the Limnitis/Yeşilirmak crossing. While civilian traffic over the crossing continued to flow reasonably unimpeded, the Turkish Cypriot side continued to increase its requests for formal escorts above the agreed number and the Greek Cypriot side denied access to a Turkish Cypriot convoy on 3 June. To ensure smooth operating of the crossing, UNFICYP has reminded both sides of their obligations stemming from their agreements of June 2009 and October 2010.

28. The Committee on Crossings, which was tasked by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in December 2010 to reach an agreement on new crossing points, did not meet during the reporting period. Despite UNFICYP engagement with both sides, their positions on the locations of new crossing points remained irreconcilable.

29. From 7 December 2012 to 12 June 2013, about 610,000 official crossings were recorded through the buffer zone. From November to April 2013, goods worth €440,000 crossed from the south to the north, while goods amounting to about €2 million moved in the opposite direction. These figures reflect a broadly downward trend in both people crossing and trade between the communities in recent years.

IV. Committee on Missing Persons

30. During the reporting period, the Committee on Missing Persons continued to carry forward its bicommunal project on the exhumation, identification and return of

the remains of missing persons. As at June 2013, the Committee's bicomunal teams of archaeologists had exhumed the remains of 978 individuals on both sides of the island. To date, the remains of 407 individuals have been returned to their respective families, including 71 during the reporting period. The sharp rise in the return of remains is largely attributable to the successful transition to the genetic laboratory of the International Commission of Missing Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the sample testing of DNA and in-house final identifications made by the Committee's own recently created genetic unit. In recent years the Committee has been granted access to unfenced military areas in the north on a case-by-case basis. In a positive development during the reporting period, the Committee for the first time also requested access to a fenced military area in the north and was granted permission.

V. Financial and administrative aspects

31. As indicated in my last report, the General Assembly, by its resolution 66/268, appropriated the amount of \$54.6 million gross for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, inclusive of the voluntary contribution of one third of the net cost of the Force, equivalent to \$17.5 million from the Government of Cyprus and the voluntary contribution of \$6.5 million from the Government of Greece. I invite other countries and organizations to do likewise, with a view to reducing the portion of the cost of UNFICYP covered by assessed contributions.

32. My proposed budget for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, as recommended in paragraph 46 below, the cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount approved by the Assembly.

33. As at 20 June 2013, the total outstanding assessed contributions to the special account for UNFICYP for the period from 16 June 1993 to 20 June 2013 amounted to \$15.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at the same date amounted to \$1,254.2 million.

34. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made only for the periods up to 30 April 2012 and 30 June 2010, respectively, owing to the delay in the receipt of assessed contributions.

VI. Observations

35. During the reporting period, the situation along the ceasefire lines remained mostly calm and stable, with a low level of military violations. The opposing forces should build on this positive trend and engage with UNFICYP on military confidence-building measures. In this context, I welcome the engagement of the UNFICYP Force Commander with the commanders of the opposing forces on this issue and hope that it may eventually result in meaningful discussions on the implementation of military confidence-building measures.

36. In the first instance, I encourage both sides to desist from challenging the United Nations delineation of the ceasefire lines and, consequently, the demarcation

of the buffer zone, which only increases tensions. I reiterate my belief that the overall situation would improve if both sides formally accepted the aide-memoire of 1989, which the United Nations has used for the past 24 years to regulate activities in the buffer zone.

37. Safety and stability in the buffer zone continued to be negatively affected by unauthorized civilian activity. Civilian activities in the buffer zone are a natural consequence of an increased sense of overall security by the local population. Such activities, however, will only promote trust between the communities if they are undertaken in accordance with UNFICYP procedures. I call upon the respective authorities to act decisively towards individuals, as well as entities, who engage in such unauthorized activities, thus showing respect for UNFICYP authority in the buffer zone and support for the mission's ability to implement its mandate.

38. In this regard, the maintenance of essential infrastructure for public utilities in the buffer zone is becoming increasingly contentious. Given that both communities have availed themselves of such utilities for decades and will continue to do so, it is important that neither side seeks exclusive control of those shared resources but that each side instead works closely with the mission according to agreed procedures. UNFICYP stands ready, as it has done in the past, to assist the sides to engage in joint technical cooperation on such issues.

39. I am concerned that the financial and economic crisis affecting Cyprus has the potential to negatively impact intercommunal contacts and relations. In this context, the downward trend in the movement of persons and the trade in goods is regrettable. I call upon both leaders to exert efforts, in both word and deed, towards creating a climate conducive to the widening and deepening of such contacts, including encouraging trade, where possible, so critical to building trust. In this regard, I welcome the recent establishment of a bicomunal radio station as an important step towards promoting a better understanding of the perspective of the other side and the effective involvement of civil society in the debate about the peace process.

40. I continue to believe that the development of economic, social, cultural, sporting or similar ties and contacts will have a positive impact on the negotiations and the broader climate. Such contacts promote trust between the communities and help to address the concerns of isolation expressed by the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, greater economic and social parity between the sides will make an eventual reunification easier and more likely. In the context of an internationally sanctioned peace process, efforts in the opposite direction can only be counterproductive.

41. I thus encourage the parties to move forward on future possible crossings, which would result in greater social and economic interaction between the communities. As we witnessed with the opening of the Ledra Street crossing in 2008, progress on this front will help to improve the overall confidence between the communities. I urge the parties to adopt a pragmatic and results-oriented approach to the issue and to do so quickly.

42. Another significant measure to build confidence between the sides would be to address the existing minefields both in and outside the buffer zone, which continue to pose a danger to both civilians and patrolling military personnel. I call upon the parties to facilitate, without delay, access to all remaining mined areas in and

outside the buffer zone, in line with Security Council resolution 2089 (2013). Such a move can be made unilaterally and does not require mutual agreement. The United Nations stands ready to assist the parties in their aspiration to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.

43. With regard to the exploitation of natural resources around Cyprus, I once again call upon all parties to make every effort to avoid raising tensions, which may have a negative impact on the security situation, including in the buffer zone. It is important to ensure that any new-found wealth, which belongs to all Cypriots, will benefit both communities. Without doubt, the discovery of offshore gas reserves constitutes a strong incentive for all parties to find a durable solution to the Cyprus problem. It is my hope that the discovery may engender deeper cooperation for the benefit of all stakeholders in the region.

44. The United Nations remains committed to supporting the critical work being done on behalf of the families of victims through the Committee on Missing Persons. I count on the support of all parties to preserve the non-political and bicommunal character of the work of the Committee. While increased access to a fenced military area in the north is a positive development which I welcome, I once again urge all parties to be more accommodating of the Committee's exhumation requirements throughout the entire island.

45. Regrettably, restrictions continue on the movement of locally employed United Nations personnel. Freedom of movement for all United Nations personnel is a matter of principle for the Organization and an operational requirement for UNFICYP. I call upon the Turkish Cypriot authorities to respect that principle.

46. UNFICYP continues to play an essential role on the island by exercising authority in the buffer zone and contributing to keeping the calm and resolving various issues that affect the everyday lives of individuals in both communities. However, its ability to play this role depends by and large on the commitment of the sides to refrain from challenging the authority and legitimacy of UNFICYP in the buffer zone. In the hope that both sides will continue to cooperate with UNFICYP in good faith, I recommend that the mandate of the mission be extended for a period of six months, until 31 January 2014.

47. UNFICYP maintains close collaboration with my mission of good offices, led by my Special Adviser, and other United Nations actors on the island. In line with relevant Security Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2089 (2013), the mission will remain engaged in contingency planning in relation to the settlement. The planning will continue to be guided by developments in the negotiations and views of the parties on the possible role of the United Nations in this respect.

48. At the same time, I shall continually keep the operations of UNFICYP under close review, taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties, and shall revert to the Council with recommendations, as appropriate, for further adjustments to the UNFICYP mandate, force levels and concept of operations as soon as warranted.

49. In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to my Special Representative and Chief of Mission, Lisa M. Bittenheim, to the Force Commander, Major General Chao Liu, and to the men and women serving in UNFICYP for the efficiency and commitment with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

**Countries providing military and police personnel to
the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(as at 20 June 2013)**


<i>Country</i>	<i>Military personnel</i>
Argentina ^a	294
Austria	4
Canada	1
China	2
Hungary ^b	84
Slovakia ^c	200
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	274
Total	859

<i>Country</i>	<i>United Nations police</i>
Australia	15
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7
Croatia	4
India	8
Ireland	12
Italy	4
Lithuania	2
Montenegro	4
Serbia	2
Slovakia	2
Ukraine	8
Total	68

^a The Argentinian contingent includes soldiers from Brazil (1), Chile (14) and Paraguay (14).

^b The Hungarian contingent includes soldiers from Serbia (7).

^c The Slovakian contingent includes soldiers from Croatia (2) and Serbia (39).



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
3 July 2013

Original: English

**Letter dated 3 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to inform you that, under the Presidency of the United States, the Security Council will hold an open debate entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict: protection of journalists" on Wednesday, 17 July 2013. In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, the United States has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rosemary A. DiCarlo
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Annex to the letter dated 3 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept paper for the open debate of the Security Council entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict: protection of journalists" (17 July 2013)

During its presidency of the Security Council in July, the United States will convene an open debate to focus on the protection of journalists. This session will build on Council resolution 1738 (2006) and the presidential statement of 12 February 2013 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PRST/2013/2), which includes explicit language on protecting journalists. It will provide Council members with an opportunity to demonstrate the Council's support for providing journalists with the necessary access and protections and for recognizing the valuable information and insights they provide indirectly to the Council in its discussions and deliberations, while learning about and considering the frequency with which acts of violence are committed against journalists and associated media personnel in many parts of the world. The session will also serve as a reminder that all perpetrators of violence against journalists must be held accountable, and that all States have a responsibility to combat impunity.

Background

Since the Security Council last considered the issue of the protection of journalists in 2006, violence against journalists has continued worldwide; in particular, there has been an increase in murders and imprisonments. In 2012 alone, 121 journalists were killed globally, more than 200 were imprisoned and many more were targeted.^a Given the critical role of journalism in informing the international community's understanding of conflict areas, we seek to underscore the vital importance of protecting journalists in these situations. The right to freedom of opinion and expression is a human right guaranteed to all, including journalists, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, journalists are entitled to the same rights online that they have offline. The 2012 report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on the United Nations Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity offers additional insights, which the Council should consider.

Open debate

We would welcome the participation of Member States in this Security Council thematic session chaired by the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. This session will demonstrate the Council's appreciation for the contributions of journalists and the risks they take. To help frame the Council's discussion in July, we plan to invite a number of media representatives to discuss issues related to the protection of journalists, including

^a The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization produces reports and data regarding the safety of journalists and on the killing of journalists. More information is available from www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/safety-of-journalists/.

their personal experiences in the field and efforts to protect their staff. These briefers will also discuss the risks they and their colleagues face in informing the broader public about threats to international peace and security, including the challenges related to access and security.

During the session, Council members may wish to address the following in their statements:

- Observations on conflict journalism
- Best practices for protecting journalists
- Examples of relevant accountability mechanisms and efforts to combat impunity
- Discussion of investigations of and prosecutions for acts of violence or fatal incidents in which journalists, media workers and related personnel are the victims
- Ways in which civil society has assisted in protecting journalists
- The importance of new and emerging technologies in providing timely and useful information in conflict areas and the associated need to maintain free and open access to these tools

Briefers

In addition to receiving a briefing from Deputy Secretary-General, Jan Eliasson, we will receive briefings from the experts below on the issue of the protection of journalists.

Richard Engel (NBC). Richard Engel has covered a wide range of conflicts, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Gaza, Libya, Egypt and Somalia. As NBC News chief foreign correspondent, Engel is widely regarded as one of America's leading foreign correspondents for his coverage of wars, revolutions and political transitions around the world over the last 15 years. Previously, Mr. Engel worked for ABC News and served as Middle East correspondent for "The World", a joint production of the BBC World Service, Public Radio International and WGBH-Boston radio, from 2001 to 2003. He has also written for *USA Today*, Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Jane's Defence Weekly. In December 2012, Mr. Engel and his crew members were abducted in Syria and freed by Ahrar al-Sham five days later. Mr. Engel wrote the book *A Fist in the Hornet's Nest: On the Ground in Baghdad Before, During and After the War* about his experience covering the war in Iraq from Baghdad. His newest book is *War Journal: My Five Years in Iraq*.

Kathleen Carroll (Associated Press/Committee to Protect Journalists). Kathleen Carroll is Executive Editor and Senior Vice-President of the Associated Press (AP) and Vice-Chair of the board of directors of the Committee to Protect Journalists. At AP, Ms. Carroll oversees all journalists based at the organization's 243 bureaus in 97 countries and manages the security threats that confront her reporters on a daily basis. She has also worked for Knight Ridder, where she served as Washington Bureau Chief and supervised both Washington and overseas coverage for the newspaper group. She has served on the Pulitzer Prize board since 2003.

Mustafa Haji Abdinur (AFP). Mustafa Haji Abdinur is a self-taught Somali journalist and radio correspondent. Mr. Abdinur founded Radio Simba, which has over 2 million listeners across southern and central Somalia. In 2009, he was awarded an International Press Freedom Award by the Committee to Protect Journalists. In his powerful acceptance speech, Mr. Abdinur spoke of fellow journalists and friends he had lost trying to bring the story of Somalia to the world. He said: "There used to be more of us. But the intensity of the war has forced so many to flee. In the past two years, there has been an exodus of journalists. There are more Somali reporters in Nairobi than Mogadishu. Needless to say, it's too dangerous for foreign journalists to cover what is now one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world."

Ghaith Abdul-Ahad (*The Guardian*). Ghaith Abdul-Ahad is an Iraqi reporter and photojournalist who has reported from many countries, including Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon, publishing stories and photographs for news outlets such as *The Guardian*, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times* and *The Times* (London). As a deserter from Saddam Hussein's army, he lived underground in Baghdad for six years. He began doing street photography in 2001 and was determined to document conditions in Baghdad during the war. This aroused suspicion. He was arrested three days before the end of major combat operations but was able to escape by bribing his guards. In October 2010, Mr. Abdul-Ahad was imprisoned for five days by Taliban fighters he had gone to interview. In 2011, he entered Libya to report on the conflict and was detained for roughly two weeks by the Libyan army. He is now reporting on the conflict in Syria.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
3 July 2013

Original: English

**Letter dated 3 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of the United States, the Security Council will hold a debate on "The situation in the Great Lakes region: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes", on Thursday, 25 July 2013. The Secretary of State of the United States, John F. Kerry, will chair the debate. In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, the United States has prepared the attached concept note (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rosemary A. DiCarlo
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Annex to the letter dated 3 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Supporting the Great Lakes Framework

During its presidency of the Security Council in July 2013, the United States of America will convene a ministerial meeting chaired by the Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry, to focus on establishing a sustainable peace in the Great Lakes region. This session, scheduled for 25 July, will build on several events that have brought renewed energy to establishing a lasting peace and tackling the underlying causes of conflict in the region, including the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region; the appointment of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson; the visit to the region in May of the Secretary-General and the President of the World Bank, followed by the first meeting of Framework signatories in Addis Ababa; the establishment of an 11+4 technical committee to develop benchmarks and monitor progress on Framework commitments; the convening, on 9 July, of women's groups from throughout the region to discuss the Framework process; and the summit of regional Heads of State, held in July under the leadership of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Building on these positive developments, the session will provide a forum to sustain high-level, international engagement on the Great Lakes issue in support of the implementation of the Framework. In the run-up to the next meeting of Framework signatories on the margins of the General Assembly in September, this ministerial meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss how the international community can support the Framework initiative.

Background

Following years of conflict that have resulted in the deaths and displacement of millions of individuals and further perpetuated the horrifying use of sexual violence and grave human rights violations as a tactic of war, the Great Lakes region now has its greatest hope for a sustainable peace in over two decades through reinvigorated commitments made by regional leaders at the highest levels, complemented by the Secretary-General's interlocking political, security and development strategy. On the political side, Framework signatories have committed themselves to measures outlined in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. On the military side, the Security Council answered the call of regional leaders to assist in a more robust military presence through the authorization of an intervention brigade under the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), tasked with helping the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to restore security in the east by combating all armed groups. On the development agenda, during the joint visit in May by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim, the announcement was made regarding a development package of \$1 billion, which added the potential for a significant "peace dividend" and incentives for implementation of the Framework, as well as a vision for enhanced regional integration and trade. As the international community supports this interlocking strategy of combining the political and

security agenda with development incentives, Framework signatories and the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region have also highlighted the need to coordinate donor efforts to ensure that they complement the Framework process.

Debate

This session will further efforts to ensure that peace in the Great Lakes region remains high on the agenda for the international community and the Security Council. Building on the model of creating a joint development and political strategy, and working with MONUSCO, the Council will for the first time receive a joint briefing by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim. Other briefers will include Special Envoy Mary Robinson and high-level representatives from the African Union, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.

During the session, briefers and Security Council members may wish to address in their statements:

- Progress made by signatories to meet their commitments contained in the Framework agreement
- Objectives to be accomplished ahead of the September meeting of Framework signatories on the margins of the General Assembly
- Recommendations for Framework benchmarks and modalities for verification of compliance with Framework commitments
- Key challenges to the implementation of the Framework and recommendations for addressing them, including ensuring civilian protection and human rights, and steps to deal with any actors that impede these objectives
- The role of regional integration in fostering long-term stability
- Member States' contributions to efforts to foster peace in the Great Lakes region

Product

We will seek Security Council agreement on the text of a presidential statement to underscore the importance of the parties' implementation of their Framework commitments, sustained engagement by the international community and greater coordination among donors to ensure that assistance supports national and regional efforts to address the root causes of conflict in the Great Lakes region.

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
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**General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 33
Prevention of armed conflict****Security Council
Sixty-eighth year****Letter dated 4 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of
Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Upon instructions from my Government, I write to bring to your attention the statement issued on 30 June 2013 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar in connection with the grave situation in the Syrian city of Homs.

In response to my appeals of distress by the citizens of Homs and its surroundings, due to the brutal and unjust attack by the Syrian regime, the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and a lot of fighters from other countries, the State of Qatar expresses its strong condemnation of the massacres committed against innocent civilians and those defending their property and their honour. The State of Qatar also warns against the use of chemical weapons against Syrian citizens by the regime.

The State of Qatar calls on the Secretary-General to do what is necessary, according to his high office, and to use all his powers to stop this ongoing unjust attack. The State of Qatar also urges the President of the General Assembly to call for the implementation of General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 67/262. Furthermore, the State of Qatar urges the Security Council to immediately intervene to stop this attack, which aims to intimidate the population of the city of Homs in order to control the city. This alarming situation requires that the Security Council convene an urgent session to discuss the deteriorating situation and its impact on Syria and the region.

The Government of the State of Qatar also warns of the horrific massacres expected to be committed in Homs as evidenced by the crimes already committed in Al-Qusayr, and expresses its deep concern over the possibility of revenge acts that would threaten not only Syria but the entire region. In this regard, the Syrian regime and its supporters are responsible for the attack against the Syrian people according to international law and international humanitarian law.



I should be grateful if the present letter could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 33.

(Signed) Meshal Hamad M. Al-Thani
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
5 July 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 33 and 34**Security Council**
Sixty-eighth year**Prevention of armed conflict****Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their
implications for international peace, security
and development****Letter dated 1 July 2013 from the Permanent Representative of
Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I draw your attention to the document A/67/875-S/2013/313 containing the letter of the representative of Azerbaijan, who makes desperate attempts to distort and misinterpret the Security Council resolutions of 1993 and the subsequent presidential statements, as well as the statements and comments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Member States pertinent to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

This work style, which stands out mainly by the circulation on a regular basis of inexpensive narratives, proves that Azerbaijan is incapable of contributing to the works of the main bodies of the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, and is aiming to disseminate propaganda in the Organization to serve its narrow political and domestic agenda. The explicit evidence for the unwillingness of the Azerbaijani authorities to compromise is found in the endless layers of lies concerning the Karabakh problem, the causes of the armed conflict, the interpretation of fundamental rules and norms of international law and the negotiation process itself.

The essence of the problem lies in the exercise by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh of their inalienable right to self-determination — in full compliance with the norms of international law and domestic law of the Soviet Union before its collapse in 1991. The conflict broke out in response to the claim for self-determination as a result of coercive policies adopted by the leadership of Azerbaijan, displayed in brutal massacres and ethnic cleansings of the 400,000-strong Armenian population of Azerbaijan as well as in the unleashing of the full-scale military aggression against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The aggression of Azerbaijan was condemned by the international community at the time. The Defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh defeated Azerbaijani forces

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and saved the civilian population from total extermination. However, Azerbaijan still hopes to solve the conflict by use of force. This is explicitly manifested in the anti-Armenian xenophobic and militant rhetoric of the highest leadership of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has been showing poor records on human rights and democracy and has been widely criticized for its authoritarian system of governance. The Azeri authorities try to gain internal legitimacy by consolidating the Azerbaijani population around the image of "our main enemies are Armenians all over the world".

Azerbaijan acted so provocatively that last year the international community, including relevant United Nations bodies, condemned the glorification of Ramil Safarov in Azerbaijan, who had become notorious for the axe killing of a sleeping Armenian officer in Budapest.

As stipulated by the Charter of the United Nations, the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is one of the four United Nations objectives, while the territorial integrity of States is a principle aimed at achieving these purposes. Distorting international law and violating the Charter, the Azerbaijani leadership sets the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan against the right of self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The aggressive policy of Azerbaijan undermines the negotiation progress conducted within the framework of the Minsk Group. The Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group have repeatedly stated that there is no military solution to the conflict and that the parties must prepare their populations for peace, not war. However, Azerbaijan continues to increase its military budget and propagate hatred against Armenians.

According to the Madrid document and repeated public statements made by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, the conflict must be settled on the basis of three principles of international law; the non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity and the equal rights and self-determination of people. By claiming Karabakh to be part of Azerbaijan, Baku rejects the right to self-determination; moreover, using militarist rhetoric it also rejects the non-use of force. The only principle Baku accepts is the principle of territorial integrity, but in a manner of distorted interpretation of the Madrid document and in contradiction to the Charter of the United Nations.

Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations held within the framework of the Minsk Group, which is the only internationally agreed format for the conflict settlement, through the distortion of the history, nature and causes of the conflict, Azerbaijan makes attempts to involve other international organizations and forums in the settlement and initiates parallel processes that hinder the negotiation process.

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs have put considerable efforts into two main dimensions: the finalization of the Basic Principles and the establishment of confidence-building measures. Azerbaijan rejected all versions of the Basic Principles proposed by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, including the latest versions presented at the summits held in the Russian Federation, in Saint Petersburg (June 2010), Sochi (March 2011) and Kazan (June 2011), respectively. It also rejected confidence-building measures proposed by the Co-Chairs with the full support of the international community such as the consolidation of the ceasefire,

the withdrawal of snipers from the line of contact and the establishment of the mechanism for the investigation of the ceasefire violations.

Unfortunately, rather than engaging genuinely and constructively in the peace process, the Azerbaijani side has embarked on the route of incessant propaganda and, this time, is entertaining the subject of the "non-compliance" of Armenia with the Security Council resolutions adopted 20 years ago. By doing so, Azerbaijan is trying to justify its stance of procrastination regarding the negotiations, accusing the mediators of "inefficient work" in order to abort the possibility of reaching a compromise solution based on the proposals of the Co-Chairs.

The 11-page "brief research" prepared by Azerbaijan only confirms the earlier statements by Armenia regarding the 1993 resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan wasn't able to cite any Security Council document containing a demand to withdraw forces from the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh adopted after the 12 May 1994 ceasefire. Why? Because the issue of surrounding territories is not the cause but the result of the conflict. It became a part of the negotiation agenda and not a precondition for the peace talks, as Azerbaijan tries to present. As the Co-Chairs have stated, nothing is agreed before everything is agreed. The only reason that the conflict is still not resolved is the lack of will by Azerbaijan to solve the conflict peacefully, as well as its continuous efforts to undermine the negotiation process and act contrary to all the arrangements agreed upon during the peace talks.

The Security Council resolutions adopted from May to November 1993 were repeatedly violated by Azerbaijan. First, the resolutions demanded "immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a view to establishing a durable cease-fire," but Azerbaijan initiated more attacks against Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan tried to use all brief ceasefires and peace talks to regroup its armies and make another strike against Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. It turned out to be a very hard task for the Armenians and the mediators to establish confidence and atmosphere of trust with Azerbaijan. In fact, Azerbaijan has been backtracking from its agreed arrangements to the present date.

The Security Council stopped adopting any further resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh, since their violation was devolving its decisions, undermining its authority and making those resolutions inefficient. The last Security Council resolution was adopted in November 1993, and only in May 1994 was a sustainable ceasefire established.

Thus, from April 1993 to May 1994, Azerbaijan undermined all ceasefire arrangements. This created a different situation, in which the issue of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh together with the issue of NKR territories controlled by Azerbaijan became a part of the peace negotiations. It is obvious that the territories around Nagorno-Karabakh are one of the main factors curbing the intention of Azerbaijan to start another aggression and ethnic cleansings against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. So, the territorial issues are a part of the negotiation process, and will be resolved in accordance with the future peace agreements.

At the same time, on 3 February 1995, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan signed another agreement on consolidating the ceasefire on the line of contact and establishing the mechanism for the investigation of violations of the ceasefire. No territorial issues were touched upon in this document.

In vain attempts to reject every responsibility for the bloody consequences of the conflict unleashed by themselves, the Azerbaijani authorities try to present the conflict as a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this regard, it should be underlined that during the conflict Azerbaijan itself initiated negotiations with Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on the highest level.

On 3 September 1993, Heydar Aliyev authorized Afeyadin Jalilov, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, to "conduct negotiations in order to arrange the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan and NKR". In response, a similar authorization was given to Arkadi Ghukasyan, Foreign Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The meeting between Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev took place on 25 September 1993 in Moscow.

The high-level meeting was followed by a series of talks between other officials of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Although Azerbaijan violated a number of ceasefires established with Nagorno-Karabakh, the final result of these negotiations was the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, which was joined by Armenia.

The background of the signing of the ceasefire agreement perfectly illustrates that when Baku strives to reach certain results, it turns to the genuine party of the conflict, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic itself, and doesn't prevent its full participation in the talks.

Regardless of the destructive stance of Azerbaijan and its non-compliance with United Nations resolutions and the norms and principles of international law, Armenia will continue her efforts towards the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue exclusively through peaceful means and on the basis of the principles, purposes and norms reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, and the provisions of the statements of the Presidents of three Co-Chair countries made in L'Aquila, Italy; Muskoka, Canada; Deauville, France; Los Cabos, Mexico; and Enniskillen, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 34, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Garen Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
5 July 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 3 July 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the request by the Security Council, in its resolution 2088 (2013) of 24 January 2013, for an update report on the situation in the Central African Republic by 30 June 2013.

In my latest report to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2013/261), dated 3 May 2013, I highlighted four priority areas of intervention for the international community, including the need to restore security and public order and to establish a representative and inclusive political process. There are ongoing discussions and events at the regional and international levels concerning the situation in the Central African Republic, the outcome of which may have a direct impact on some of these priorities.

More specifically, on 17 June 2013, the African Union Peace and Security Council agreed, in principle, to establish an African-led international support mission for the Central African Republic. The Peace and Security Council agreed to make a final decision on the mission on the basis of a concept of operations and a concept of logistical support to be submitted by the African Union Commission by 17 July 2013. In this regard, the Commission is hosting an expert meeting in Addis Ababa from 2 to 5 July 2013 to develop the requested documents and has invited the United Nations to participate. In addition, on 8 July 2013, the second meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic is scheduled to be held. Whereas the inaugural meeting of the International Contact Group was an opportunity to bring the international community together for the first time, this second meeting will help set the course of the international response to the crisis in the Central African Republic.

Within the United Nations, we are also seeking to better document the humanitarian impact of the current situation, as requested by the Council. I am therefore dispatching Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, to the Central African Republic on 11 and 12 July 2013. In addition, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has dispatched a fact-finding mission to the country that is expected to complete its work on 14 July.

In the light of these important developments and their potential impact on our collective analysis of the situation in the Central African Republic and the role that the international community can most usefully play in support of long-term stability



and peace in the country. I would like to request an extension, until 31 July 2013, of the deadline for the submission of my report to the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon



Security Council

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Letter dated 5 July 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 3 July 2013 (S/2013/397) concerning your report pursuant to resolution 2088 (2013) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

The members of the Security Council have taken note that there are delays in the issuance of the aforementioned report and look forward to receiving it as close to the due date as possible.

(Signed) Rosemary A. DiCarlo
President of the Security Council

